Overview

Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) is a systematic approach to recognizing hazards, evaluating risk, and making safe decisions before and during small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) operations. For Part 107 remote pilots, ADM is not a separate theory topic; it is the operating framework that connects regulatory compliance, preflight inspection, aircraft condition, weather evaluation, and emergency response.

This chapter covers:

The remote pilot in command’s authority and responsibility for safety

Structured decision-making models such as PAVE, IMSAFE, 3P, and DECIDE

Hazardous attitudes and their antidotes

Human factors including fatigue, stress, distraction, and external pressure

Aircraft condition, maintenance, and preflight requirements

Safe decision-making in abnormal and emergency situations

Key Part 107 regulations that require ADM-based action

The central idea is that the remote pilot in command must make a deliberate go/no-go decision before every flight and must be willing to terminate or delay a flight whenever safety margins are reduced.

Core ADM Concepts and Decision-Making Models

The Remote Pilot in Command as Final Authority

Under 14 CFR §107.19, the remote pilot in command (RPIC) is directly responsible for the safe operation of the small unmanned aircraft. The RPIC is the final authority as to whether a mission can be conducted safely.

This authority means:

A customer, supervisor, or manager cannot require the remote pilot to fly unsafely.

The remote pilot may decline or terminate a flight even when the aircraft is airworthy and the airspace is clear, if pilot fitness or other risk factors are inadequate.

An air traffic control instruction may be declined if compliance would violate visual line of sight requirements or create a hazard.

The remote pilot is expected to use all available resources, including visual observers, weather information, checklists, and manufacturer guidance.

A decision to postpone or cancel a flight is a lawful and professional action whenever the RPIC determines that risk cannot be safely managed.

Structured Risk Management Models

Several FAA-supported models help remote pilots organize their decision-making before and during flight.

PAVE Model

The PAVE model divides operational risk into four categories:

PAVE Element	Examples for Remote Pilots
Pilot	Fatigue, illness, stress, medication, currency, experience
Aircraft	Damage, battery condition, firmware status, manufacturer limitations
enVironment	Wind, rain, temperature, airspace, TFRs, NOTAMs, obstacles, people
External Pressures	Customer deadlines, contract schedules, supervisor demands, family issues

A thorough preflight risk assessment should evaluate all four categories. If any category contains an unacceptable hazard, the flight should not begin until the hazard is eliminated or mitigated.

IMSAFE Self-Assessment

The IMSAFE checklist is used to evaluate personal fitness for flight:

I — Illness

M — Medication

S — Stress

A — Alcohol

F — Fatigue

E — Emotion

Any significant factor in the IMSAFE checklist can degrade judgment, reaction time, attention, and situational awareness. A remote pilot who is fatigued, emotionally stressed, or otherwise impaired should delay or decline the flight, even if the aircraft and weather appear acceptable.

Part 107 does not prescribe specific duty-time limits, but it does require the remote pilot to be able to make safety-critical decisions and to avoid careless or reckless operations.

3P Model

The 3P model is a practical risk management cycle:

45.Perceive — Identify hazards involving the pilot, aircraft, environment, and external pressures.

46.Process — Evaluate the severity and likelihood of each hazard. Consider the possible outcomes and available mitigations.

47.Perform — Take action to eliminate or reduce risk. If the risk cannot be reduced to an acceptable level, do not fly or discontinue the flight.

For example, a pilot who notices a worsening wind trend during preflight should perceive the wind as a hazard, process that the wind may soon exceed the aircraft’s maximum limit, and perform the safe action of delaying or canceling the mission.

DECIDE Model

The DECIDE model is especially useful for in-flight changes and abnormal conditions:

52.Detect — Notice that a condition has changed.

53.Estimate — Assess the impact of the change on safety.

54.Choose — Select a safe outcome or course of action.

55.Identify — Identify the specific actions needed to achieve that outcome.

56.Do — Execute the actions.

57.Evaluate — Monitor the result and adjust as needed.

Example: A remote pilot notices the sUAS drifting downwind more than expected. The pilot detects the drift, estimates the risk of reduced control authority, chooses to abort the mission and land, identifies a clear landing area, executes the landing, and evaluates whether the aircraft can be safely recovered.

Hazardous Attitudes and Their Antidotes

ADM training identifies five hazardous attitudes that can lead to poor decisions. In addition, complacency is a common pilot error in UAS operations because of repetitive missions and routine preflight checks.

Hazardous Attitude	Typical Thought	Antidote
Anti-authority	“Don’t tell me.”	Follow the rules. They are usually right.
Impulsivity	“Do it quickly.”	Not so fast. Think first.
Invulnerability	“It won’t happen to me.”	It could happen to me.
Macho	“I can do it.”	Taking chances is foolish.
Resignation	“What’s the use?”	I am not helpless. I can make a difference.

Complacency is another dangerous attitude. It occurs when repeated successful flights or routine operations cause a pilot to lower standards, skip checklists, or ignore minor abnormalities. The FAA emphasizes that each flight must be treated as a separate operation requiring its own preflight inspection and risk assessment.

Example: Skipping the preflight inspection because the same drone has been flown successfully all week is a classic complacency error. Under 14 CFR §107.49, a preflight inspection is required before each operation, regardless of the aircraft’s recent flight history.

Human Factors in Remote Pilot Operations

Fatigue

Fatigue reduces:

Reaction time

Attention span

Decision-making accuracy

Situational awareness

Ability to detect and respond to abnormal conditions

Fatigue symptoms may include yawning, difficulty focusing on the ground control station, tendency to skip checklist items, and slower recognition of drift or aircraft attitude changes.

ADM-based action for fatigue:

Terminate or delay the flight.

Rest before resuming operations.

Do not allow customer or supervisor pressure to override physical or mental impairment.

Example: After a long shift, a fatigued remote pilot is asked to perform a quick UAS inspection. The best ADM decision is to refuse or defer the flight until rested, even if the request comes from a supervisor.

Stress and Emotion

Personal stress, family emergencies, financial pressure, and emotional upset can degrade performance in the same general manner as fatigue. Remote pilots should use the IMSAFE checklist and delay operations until they are mentally fit.

Distractions

Distractions during flight are hazardous because they can cause loss of visual line of sight, missed control inputs, or delayed hazard recognition.

Best practices include:

Do not answer phone calls or text messages while flying.

If a non-essential message must be addressed, land the aircraft first.

Maintain continuous visual observation of the sUAS and the surrounding airspace.

Avoid focusing excessively on the camera or FPV display while ignoring the aircraft’s position and proximity to obstacles or people.

Losing visual line of sight because of a distraction does not permit the pilot to continue relying on FPV or maps. The correct action is to regain visual contact or land.

External Pressure

External pressure is one of the most common causes of poor ADM. Sources include:

Customers demanding immediate results

Supervisors emphasizing deadlines or contract costs

The desire to complete a mission already in progress

Pressure to fly with incomplete preflight planning

External pressure does not change operational risk. The remote PIC must treat external pressure as a hazard and use the same risk management tools to resist unsafe decisions.

Example: A client insists that a cracked propeller will “probably hold” for one quick flight. The remote pilot must refuse to fly until the propeller is replaced or the aircraft is confirmed airworthy.

Crew Resource Management and Visual Observers

When a visual observer (VO) is used, effective communication is required under 14 CFR §107.33. The VO must be able to see the sUAS and communicate with the remote pilot.

Hazardous crew practices include:

Dismissing the VO’s hazard warning

Telling the VO to remain quiet while the RPIC focuses on the camera

Failing to brief the VO on the mission plan and emergency procedures

Best ADM practice requires assertive but respectful communication. If the VO warns that the aircraft is drifting toward a person or obstacle, the RPIC should immediately evaluate the information and take corrective action.

Aircraft Condition and Preflight Decision-Making

Preflight Inspection Requirements

14 CFR §107.49 requires the remote pilot in command to inspect the small unmanned aircraft system before each flight to ensure it is in a condition for safe operation.

Key points:

The fact that the aircraft flew successfully earlier in the day does not eliminate the requirement for a new preflight inspection.

A preflight inspection must check the aircraft structure, propellers, motors, batteries, control surfaces, and any installed payload or equipment.

If any defect is found that could affect safe flight, the aircraft must be grounded until corrected.

Skipping a preflight inspection because the aircraft “already flew fine” is both a regulatory violation and an ADM error.

Condition for Safe Operation

Under 14 CFR §107.15, a remote pilot may not operate a small unmanned aircraft unless it is in a condition for safe operation.

This includes:

No known damage to propellers, motor mounts, arms, landing gear, or airframe components

Batteries that are not swollen, damaged, or below required charge

Firmware and software that are current for safe operation

Components and systems functioning within manufacturer specifications

A known defect cannot be ignored simply because the aircraft powers on or hovers briefly. For example:

A cracked propeller can fail in flight and cause loss of control.

A cracked motor mount or cooling fin can progress to structural failure.

A swollen LiPo battery is a fire and power-loss hazard.

An abnormal motor temperature may indicate bearing wear, cooling failure, or electrical stress.

If an abnormal condition is detected but is not fully understood, the safest ADM action is to investigate and ground the aircraft if the condition persists.

Manufacturer Limitations and Updates

Manufacturer operating limitations are part of the safe operating envelope. Exceeding them may violate §107.15 and §107.23.

Examples of manufacturer limitations:

Maximum wind speed

Prohibited operation in rain or precipitation

Temperature limits

Maximum takeoff weight

Minimum battery state of charge or reserve capacity

A remote pilot should refuse to fly when conditions exceed manufacturer limits, even if the customer or supervisor wants the mission completed.

Mandatory manufacturer updates that correct known unsafe conditions should be treated like required safety actions. If a firmware update corrects a flight-control anomaly, the remote pilot should install the update before further flight. The delay caused by the update is minor compared with the risk of uncommanded descent or loss of control.

Airworthiness Directives and Maintenance Records

If an Airworthiness Directive or similar mandatory action applies to the small UAS or its components, the aircraft must be in compliance before operation.

Maintenance records should:

Accurately document the aircraft condition

Record defects and corrective actions

Include the date, description of work, and signature when a repair or replacement is performed

Not be signed off unless the required work was actually completed

Failing to document a minor defect, such as antenna wear, may seem insignificant, but it denies future pilots important safety information and can lead to an unsafe operation.

Battery and Energy Management

Battery management is one of the most common operational decisions in UAS flights.

Battery Reserve Concept

A safe flight requires more than enough battery capacity to complete the planned mission. The pilot must also have energy for:

Return flight

Headwind correction

Holding or maneuvering

Landing with a safe reserve

A basic energy decision can be expressed conceptually as:

Required endurance = Mission time + Return time + Reserve

If the available battery endurance is less than the required endurance, the flight should not be started or continued.

Example: A drone has 12 minutes of endurance remaining. The planned mission will take 15 more minutes, and the return flight against a headwind will take 7 minutes. Because the total requirement exceeds 12 minutes, the correct decision is to return immediately, not to take additional photos.

Low-Battery Warning

A low-battery warning is a critical flight condition. The pilot should:

Immediately terminate or abbreviate the mission

Maneuver toward a safe landing area

Avoid climbing unnecessarily

Avoid flying over congested areas or people

Land with sufficient battery reserve

Continuing to “get one more photo” after a low-battery warning can lead to an unintended descent over people, vehicles, or structures.

Effects of Wind on Battery Performance

Strong headwinds can deplete battery faster than predicted because the aircraft must use more energy to maintain groundspeed. A pilot who notices that the battery is draining faster than planned should reassess the mission and return early, not extend the flight to finish the survey.

Regulatory Requirements and Safety Procedures

Hazardous Operation

Under 14 CFR §107.23, no person may operate a small unmanned aircraft in a careless or reckless manner that endangers life or property of another.

ADM directly supports this regulation because decisions that ignore known hazards, exceed manufacturer limits, or continue after abnormal indications are often careless or reckless.

Remote Pilot in Command Authority

14 CFR §107.19 makes the remote pilot in command responsible for determining whether the operation can be conducted safely.

Even when other people are involved, the RPIC has final authority:

A visual observer may provide warnings, but the RPIC is still responsible.

A supervisor may request a flight, but the RPIC may refuse.

A customer may offer payment, but the RPIC must not override safety.

An ATC instruction is not a valid reason to violate visual line of sight requirements.

Visual Line of Sight

14 CFR §107.31 requires the remote pilot in command to maintain visual line of sight of the small unmanned aircraft. This means the pilot must be able to see the aircraft well enough to know its position, attitude, altitude, and direction of flight.

Important ADM points:

FPV camera views and moving-map displays do not satisfy visual line of sight.

If the aircraft is lost from visual sight, the pilot must attempt to regain sight and land if visual contact cannot be reestablished.

Distraction, sun glare, darkness, or distance can cause loss of visual line of sight.

The pilot should not accept an ATC instruction to fly beyond visual line of sight unless a compliant visual observer arrangement exists.

Visual Observer Coordination

Under 14 CFR §107.33, a visual observer must be able to see the small UAS and communicate effectively with the remote pilot.

ADM-based coordination includes:

Briefing the VO before flight

Listening to the VO’s hazard warnings

Using clear, assertive language

Taking action when a hazard is identified

Dismissing a visual observer’s warning is both poor crew resource management and potentially hazardous.

Right of Way

Under 14 CFR §107.37, a small unmanned aircraft must yield the right of way to all manned aircraft.

When a manned aircraft enters the area:

The remote pilot must maneuver the sUAS away from the manned aircraft.

The pilot should maintain visual awareness and avoid passing over, under, or directly in front of manned aircraft.

The immediate action is to yield and avoid, not to continue the inspection or finish data collection.

Operations Over People

14 CFR §107.39 generally restricts operations over people who are not directly participating in the UAS operation and are not protected by a compliant structure or approved category.

From an ADM perspective, if a person walks under the sUAS:

The immediate priority is to move the aircraft away from the person.

If the flight cannot be shifted to a clear area, the pilot should land.

Continuing to hover or operate over a non-participating person creates an immediate hazard.

Temporary Flight Restrictions

14 CFR §107.45 prohibits small UAS operations within a Temporary Flight Restriction unless authorized.

If a TFR is discovered during preflight planning:

The remote pilot should stand down and cancel or reschedule the operation.

A phone call to a supervisor or client is not authorization.

The flight should not be conducted merely because the TFR boundary is nearby or because the mission is important.

In-Flight Emergency Authority

Under 14 CFR §107.21, the remote pilot in command may deviate from any Part 107 rule to the extent necessary to respond to an in-flight emergency.

This authority is not a blanket permission to violate rules; it permits necessary deviations when immediate action is needed to protect safety.

During an emergency, the priority order is:

217.Maintain or regain aircraft control

218.Protect people and property on the ground

219.Land safely

220.Then document and report as required

Emergency and Abnormal Situation Procedures

Loss of Command and Control Link

When command and control link is lost, the remote pilot should:

Follow the manufacturer’s approved lost-link procedure, which often includes automatic return-to-home.

Maintain visual line of sight and monitor the aircraft’s flight path.

Ensure the return-to-home route is clear of obstacles, people, and other aircraft.

If the automatic route is unsafe, attempt to regain control and override the path to a clear landing area, if the system allows.

The purpose is not simply to recover the aircraft, but to bring it down safely without endangering persons or property.

Loss of GPS

GPS loss can cause the UAS to drift, switch to attitude mode, or behave unpredictably.

ADM-based response:

Do not rely on an unreliable GPS position.

Switch to manual or attitude control if needed.

Maintain visual line of sight.

Fly the aircraft to a safe location and land as soon as possible.

A safe manual landing is generally preferable to trusting an automated return-to-home function when GPS has been lost.

Wind Exceeding Aircraft Limits

If wind exceeds the manufacturer’s recommended limit or the UAS becomes difficult to control:

Do not continue the mission for the sake of data collection.

Identify the nearest safe landing area.

Land as soon as possible.

Use control inputs to maintain stability during the descent.

A remote pilot should already have planned for unexpected wind conditions and should be ready to shift from mission goals to landing safety.

Motor or Propeller Damage

If a motor fails or a propeller is damaged:

Immediately prioritize aircraft control.

Direct the aircraft toward a clear area away from people and structures.

Use available control authority to maintain a controlled descent.

Accept damage to the aircraft as secondary to ground safety.

After any suspected or actual bird strike, collision, or hard landing:

Land as soon as safe.

Inspect the aircraft for cracks, delamination, loose components, battery damage, and propeller damage.

Do not continue flight merely because the camera feed and basic controls still appear functional.

People or Vehicles Entering the Area

If a ground crew member, pedestrian, or vehicle enters the area beneath or near the sUAS:

Immediately maneuver the aircraft away.

If a safe standoff distance cannot be maintained, land.

Do not fly over non-participating people.

Indoor UAS operations require the same caution. Even inside a hangar, non-participating personnel must be kept clear, and the aircraft must remain within visual line of sight.

Common Relationships Between ADM Concepts and Regulations

Several important relationships connect the decision-making models to Part 107 requirements.

Preflight Inspection and Condition for Safe Operation

14 CFR §107.49 requires a preflight inspection before every flight.

14 CFR §107.15 prohibits operation unless the aircraft is safe.

A skipped inspection is both a regulatory violation and a complacency hazard.

External Pressure and Hazardous Attitudes

Customer deadlines and supervisor demands create external pressure.

External pressure can encourage invulnerability, macho thinking, or resignation.

The antidote is to follow standardized checklists and treat no-go decisions as professional, not personal.

Fatigue, Stress, and Safety Performance

Fatigue and stress reduce situational awareness and decision quality.

Part 107 does not list specific duty limits, but §107.19 and §107.23 require a fit remote pilot.

The IMSAFE checklist provides a structured way to self-assess fitness.

Emergency Priorities and Regulatory Compliance

In an emergency, §107.21 permits necessary deviations from Part 107 rules.

The first ADM priority is always aircraft control and protection of persons and property.

Emergency deviations do not permit careless or reckless operations.

Manufacturer Procedures and Lost-Link Safety

Manufacturer lost-link procedures are part of the safe operating plan.

Following the approved procedure is an ADM action, not merely a technical preference.

If the programmed path is unsafe, the remote pilot must take available action to protect people and property.

Summary of Safe ADM-Based Decisions

A remote pilot using ADM consistently makes decisions such as:

Delaying a flight when fatigued, stressed, or distracted

Refusing to fly with a cracked propeller, swollen battery, or structural damage

Landing early when the battery reserve is insufficient for the mission and return

Aborting a mission when wind, rain, or GPS loss reduces aircraft controllability

Yielding to manned aircraft and moving away from people

Complying with TFRs and NOTAMs even when schedule pressure exists

Listening to visual observers and accepting hazard input

Documenting maintenance defects accurately

Following manufacturer limitations and mandatory safety updates

The central principle of Part 107 ADM is simple: No mission, contract, or schedule is worth compromising safety. The remote pilot in command has both the authority and the obligation to make that decision before and during every flight.

Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM)